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RENA M. LINDEVALDSEN

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization:
The Court’s Opportunity to Overrule Roe, or, at
Least, Correct the Evidentiary Catch-22 Created by
Roe and Casey
ABSTRACT
The 1954 Dr. Seuss classic, Horton Hears a Who, rests on the foundational
truth that “a person’s a person no matter how small.”1 Since Roe, however,
more than 60 million of the smallest persons in the United States have been
destroyed in the womb. Because the Court has refused to answer when life
begins but nevertheless established viability as the point at which a state’s
interest becomes sufficient to prohibit abortion (subject to the life and health
of the mother), states have struggled to pass legislation in defense of the
unborn that withstands judicial scrutiny. In particular, lower courts have
interpreted the viability standard to mean that any law prohibiting abortion
(with health and life exceptions) before viability is per se unconstitutional. As
a result, courts have not permitted states to introduce evidence of fetal
heartbeat or fetal pain, which would undermine Roe’s conclusion that it could
not decide when life begins.
This Article will review existing abortion precedent, explain the catch-22
states face in their efforts to reverse Roe, and discuss how the Court should
decide in Dobbs to reverse Roe or, at a minimum, abandon viability as the
first point in which the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
unborn baby.

1

DR. SUESS, HORTON HEARS A WHO! 6 (1954). Scripture tells us that God is the author of
all life, that He knew us before we were even born, and that He knit us together in our
mother’s womb. See Genesis 1:27; Psalm 139:13.
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DOBBS V. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION: THE
COURT’S OPPORTUNITY TO OVERRULE ROE OR, AT LEAST,
CORRECT THE EVIDENTIARY CATCH-22 CREATED BY ROE AND
CASEY
Rena M. Lindevaldsen†
I. INTRODUCTION
In its decision in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court ushered in “legalized”
abortion, resulting in more than 60 million abortions during the past fortynine years.2 What compounds this tragic loss of human life is the Court’s
characterization of the fetus as only “potential life”3 rather than human life.
After the Court explained that the question of when life begins is a “difficult
question” that lacks “any consensus” as to an answer by “those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology,”4 the Court
concluded it did not need to answer the question of when life begins to
declare a woman’s right to an abortion.5 That decision ignored the obvious—
if the fetus is an unborn human life, then an abortion results in the
destruction of a human life.
Even though the Court stated it could not answer the question of when life
begins “at this point in development of man’s knowledge”—suggesting that
it could do so at a later time—Casey’s viability standard has caused lower
courts to refuse to allow discovery of facts that would undermine the factual
assumptions in Roe.6 If courts were to allow evidence of fetal heartbeat, fetal
†

Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. J.D., magna cum laude, Brooklyn
Law School. The author wishes to thank the Liberty University Law Review for hosting a
symposium on issues related to sanctity of human life. I am grateful to be among a student
body and colleagues who understand that God is the author of all life and every human being
from the moment of conception to the moment of death has innate worth as an individual
created in the image of God.
2
Sam Dorman, An Estimated 62 Million Abortions Have Occurred Since Roe v. Wade
Decision in 1973, FOX NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021, 6:33 PM),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/abortions-since-roe-v-wade.
3
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
4
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 270, 275 (5th Cir. 2019)
(the trial court refused to permit discovery on fetal pain because it did not relate to viability);
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pain, and whether abortions are safer than childbirth, the Court could move
the judicially recognized line of when life begins back from viability to a point
in time much closer to conception.7
As the Supreme Court considers in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization8 whether to reverse Roe, it would be wise to consider the
dilemma posed by “Pascal’s wager.” Pascal begins by presenting a decision
that each person must make: Either a person will choose to believe in God or
she will not.9 Because Pascal believed that reason alone could not lead a
person to reach a conclusive decision on the question, Pascal posed the
question of “how will you wager” rather than what will you choose.10 He
explained that each person must choose—indeed, each person has already
made a choice, whether the person realizes it or not.11 Even when a person
says she has not made a choice, that is itself a choice. Here are the possible
wagers a person can choose with respect to whether God exists.
• If God really exists, and we wager that God exists, we have
an infinite gain (eternity in heaven).
• If God really exists, and we do not wager that He exists,
then we have the potential of an infinite loss (hell for
eternity, or at least eternal separation from God).
• If God really does not exist, and we wager that God exists,
we essentially lose nothing.
• If God really does not exist, and we wager that God does
not exist, we essentially gain nothing.12
MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 773 n.4 (8th Cir. 2015) (limiting discovery to
the issue of viability).
7
For example, in Dobbs, the state offered expert testimony that “it was ‘universally
accepted’ that a fetus has a neural network ‘capable of pain perception’ at some point
‘between [14–20] weeks’” gestation. Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 279–80 (Ho, J., concurring). Fetal
heartbeat is detectable around six weeks gestation. See MKB, 795 F.3d at 772 (“[T]he parties
do not dispute that fetal heartbeats are detectable at about 6 weeks[.]”).
8
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 141
S. Ct. 2619 (2021).
9
BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES, § III, para. 233 (2016); see also Pascal’s Wager, ST. MARY’S,
http://sites.saintmarys.edu/~incandel/pasc
alswager.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).
10
PASCAL, supra note 9, § III, para. 233.
11
Id.
12
Pascal’s Wager, supra note 9. Another example is “Schrodinger’s Cat.” See Christopher
S. Baird, What Did Schrodinger’s Cat Experiment Prove?, SCI. QUESTIONS WITH SURPRISING
ANSWERS (July 30, 2013), https://www.wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2013/07/30/what-did-
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The same logic applies to the Supreme Court’s assertion that it cannot
decide when life begins while also legalizing abortion. By supposedly not
deciding when life begins, the Court already has made a choice—that the
fetus is not a human life because if it were a human life, abortion would be
the killing of innocent human life. Hopefully, the Court would reverse Roe if
it knew abortion killed an innocent human life.
Here are the first two options of Pascal’s wager, restated in the abortion
context.
• If the fetus is a human life, and we wager it is (and,
therefore, do not allow abortions), we have infinite gain
(preserving innocent life).
• If the fetus is a human life, and we wager that it is not (and
therefore allow abortions), we have infinite loss
(destroying innocent human life).
The last two options cannot logically be articulated because if a woman
does not abort and gives birth, she will deliver a human life.13 Unlike Pascal’s
wager, where it is not presently possible to conclusively prove God’s existence
to those who do not believe God exists, it is possible to conclusively prove
that what is growing in the womb is a human life because after nine months
gestation the woman gives birth to a human life; she does not give birth to an
inanimate object or any other living species. Thus, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Roe and Casey, where it said it was not deciding when life begins,
is indeed a decision—a decision to allow the killing of innocent human life.14

schrodingers-cat-experiment-prove/. Although Schrodinger’s Cat was not a real experiment,
it was used as a teaching tool “to illustrate how some people were misinterpreting quantum
theory. Schrodinger constructed his imaginary experiment with the cat to demonstrate that
simple misinterpretations of quantum theory can lead to absurd results which do not match
the real world.” Id. In the case of Schrodinger’s imaginary experiment, you end up with a cat
in the box that you believe is both alive and dead at the same time because of your faulty
understanding of quantum theory. Id. That aptly describes the faulty conclusion reached in
the Court’s abortion jurisprudence: the fetus is both a life and not a life depending on a
faulty belief about the nature of the life growing in the womb.
13
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (“‘[R]easoned judgment’ does not begin by begging the question,
as Roe and subsequent cases unquestionably did by assuming that what the state is protecting
is the mere ‘potentiality of human life.’”).
14
Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 982 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The whole argument
of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls the fetus and what others call the unborn
child is a human life. Thus, whatever answer Roe came up with after concluding its
‘balancing’ is bound to be wrong, unless it is correct that the human fetus is in some critical
sense merely potentially human.”).
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More than a decade after Roe, Justice White acknowledged that a fetus is
of the same “character” before viability as it is after viability, and that the
State’s interest is equally compelling throughout a pregnancy.15 In Justice
White’s dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, he stated that “[t]he State’s interest is in the fetus as an entity
in itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point of
viability under conventional medical wisdom. Accordingly, the State’s
interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability.”16
Yet, the Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence minimizes the
State’s interest in pre-viability, only permitting the State to implement health
and safety regulations before viability.
This Article briefly explains the Supreme Court’s abortion precedent, as
developed through Roe, Casey, and subsequent case law. It then discusses the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Jackson
Women’s Health Organization v. Dobbs,17 highlighting the refusal by lower
courts to permit discovery on the issue of pre-viability fetal pain because of
the Supreme Court’s viability standard. The Article concludes by explaining
why the Supreme Court should seize Dobbs as an opportunity to put an end
to legalized, elective abortion. To the extent the Court does not use Dobbs to
reverse Roe’s conclusion that there is a right to abortion, the Court must at
least abandon the viability line as the point when the State’s interest in the
life of the unborn can justify prohibiting abortion. If the Court abandoned
the viability line, states could take discovery and admit evidence
demonstrating that the fetus is a human life long before viability, that
abortions are not as safe as Roe assumed, or that women do not need abortion
to have equal life opportunities.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S ABORTION PRECEDENT
It has been nearly fifty years since Roe was decided. Even though the Court
has continued to affirm a right to abortion, it has never answered the
foundational question—whether abortion is the destruction of a human life.
In Roe, the Court concluded that the fetus is not a “person” for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process guarantees, but said it could not—
indeed, did not need to—answer the question of when life begins.18 Nearly
twenty years after Roe, the Court had the opportunity in Casey to reverse Roe
15
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting).
16
Id.
17
See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021).
18
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
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based on the fact that abortion kills an unborn human life. Instead, the Court
dug its heels in, affirming a woman’s right to abortion.19 Rather than answer
the question of when life begins, the Court said that even if its decision in
Roe were in error, stare decisis required the Court to affirm Roe.20
Significantly, the Court was concerned that if it reversed Roe, the Court
would lose credibility in the eyes of the American people. Since Casey, states
have passed laws that seek to protect the human life growing in the womb,
often with the Court striking down those laws as an undue burden on the
woman’s right to choose abortion.21 Those efforts laid the groundwork for
the statute at issue in Dobbs. The Mississippi statute seeks to force the Court
to answer the question of when life begins. The statute prohibits most
abortions after fifteen weeks gestation because that is when medical
professionals assert that an unborn baby can feel pain.22
A.

Roe v. Wade23

In 1973, the United States Supreme Court declared a right to abortion.24
In reaching that decision, the Court admitted that the Constitution does not
explicitly mention a right to privacy but found a privacy right to abortion
arising out of the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.25 After identifying prior
decisions where the Court had declared a right to marriage, procreation,
19

Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
Id. at 858 (“Even on the assumption that the central holding of Roe was in error, that
error would go only to the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the
recognition afforded by the Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”); id. at 869 (“A decision to
overrule Roe’s essential holding the existing circumstances would address error, if error there
was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to
the Nation’s commitment to the rule of law.”).
21
See, e.g., June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (striking down statute
that required abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles
of the abortion clinic); Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 (striking down as an undue burden the spousal
notification requirement); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d 536,
541–43 (S.D. Miss. 2018) (striking down statute that prohibited abortions after fifteen
weeks).
22
See Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 279–80 (Ho, J., concurring); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41191 (2022).
23
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (noting the right of personal privacy includes the right of a woman
to decide to have an abortion).
25
Id. at 152 (“The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.”). See
Rena M. Lindevaldsen, When the Pursuit of Liberty Collides with the Rule of Law, 11 LIBERTY
U. L. REV. 667, 670 (2017) (discussing the meaning of “penumbra” and explaining that, by
definition, any right that exists as the penumbra is of a lesser degree than the express rights
in the Constitution).
20
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contraception, and child rearing, the Court concluded that the privacy right
“is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”26 Before reaching that decision, the Roe Court
conceded that a woman’s asserted right to abortion would fail if the unborn
fetus were established to be a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment;27 but the Court, nevertheless, stated that it “need not resolve
the difficult question of when life begins.”28
Admittedly, the questions of whether someone qualifies as a “person”
entitled to due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (which the Court answered in the negative)29 and
when a human life begins (which the Court did not answer)30 are different.
But the Court’s decision that an unborn fetus is not entitled to the due process
protections afforded to a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment31 does
not absolve the Court of the logical results of its purported refusal to decline
to answer whether the unborn fetus is a human life. Namely, to the extent the
unborn fetus is a growing human life, an abortion ends that life.
As the Court fleshed out the scope of the abortion right, it rejected the
argument that the right is absolute, acknowledging the State’s interests in
health, medical standards, and protecting potential life.32 Nevertheless, the
Court held that the decision whether to abort rests entirely with the mother
during the first trimester.33 It was not until the point of viability—when the
“[fetus] has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”34—
that the State’s interests become strong enough to override the woman’s right
to abortion. Subsequent case law, however, demonstrates that the Court has
required states to permit a woman to have an abortion up to the point of birth
based on very liberally construed exceptions for the health and life of the
mother.35
In addition to the life-or-death consequences resulting from the Court’s
refusal to protect unborn life prior to viability by ostensibly declining to
26

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 156–57.
28
Id. at 159.
29
Id. at 158.
30
Id. at 159.
31
Id. at 158.
32
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54.
33
Id. at 163.
34
Id.
35
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (explaining that all of the following factors
relate to the health exception: “physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s
age”).
27
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answer whether the fetus is a human life, another significant concern over
the years has been the arbitrariness of Roe’s choosing viability as the point at
which a state can prohibit abortion, albeit with broadly construed exceptions
for the health and life of the mother. Professor Randy Beck stated that the
viability standard was created practically out of whole cloth given that there
was no “evidentiary record” on the issue, and it “was not discussed in the
briefs or arguments.”36 During the oral arguments in Dobbs, Chief Justice
Roberts asked Mississippi’s Solicitor General whether viability was even an
issue in Roe.37 Chief Justice Roberts also explained that the publicly-released
notes of Justice Blackmun, who authored Roe, state that the viability standard
was merely dicta in the case.38 Ten years after Roe, Justice O’Connor
explained in her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. that:
[t]he fallacy inherent in the Roe framework is apparent:
just because the State has a compelling interest in ensuring
maternal safety once an abortion may be more dangerous
than childbirth, it simply does not follow that the State
has no interest before that point that justifies state regulation
to ensure that first-trimester abortions are performed as
safely as possible.
The state interest in potential human life is likewise extant
throughout pregnancy. In Roe, the Court held that although
the State had an important and legitimate interest in
protecting potential life, that interest could not become
compelling until the point at which the fetus was viable. The
difficulty with this analysis is clear: potential life is no less
potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability
or afterward. At any stage in pregnancy, there is
36

See Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 744 (Ala. 2012) (Parker, J., concurring) (quoting
Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester Framework, 51
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 511–12 (2011)). Justice Parker in Hamilton further explained that
although Roe cited Blackstone, it
failed to note that Blackstone addressed the legal protection of the unborn
child within a section entitled ‘The Law of Persons.’ It also ignored the
opening line of his paragraph describing the law’s treatment of the unborn
child: ‘Life is an immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual.’
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 743.
37
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–19, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392).
38
Id. at 19.
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the potential for human life. Although the Court refused to
“resolve the difficult question of when life begins,” the Court
chose the point of viability—when the fetus is capable of life
independent of its mother—to permit the complete
proscription of abortion. The choice of viability as the point
at which the state interest in potential life becomes
compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point
before viability or any point afterward. Accordingly, I
believe that the State’s interest in protecting potential human
life exists throughout the pregnancy.39
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey40

B.

Nineteen years after Roe, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey41 affirmed its prior declaration of the
right to abortion.42 The Casey Court, like the Roe Court, refused to directly
answer the question of whether the fetus is a human life.43 In fact, based on
concern over the Court’s legitimacy if it reversed Roe, the Court refused to
even state whether Roe was properly decided.44 Specifically, the Court stated
that a decision overruling Roe “would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity
to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a
nation dedicated to the rule of law.”45 Instead of overruling Roe, the Court
stated:
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been
Members of the Court when the valuation of the state
interest came before it as an original matter, would have
concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is
insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability
even when it is subject to certain exceptions.46
Earlier in the opinion, the Court expressly stated that it should affirm Roe
39

City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 460–61 (1983) (emphasis
in original); see also Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 744–45 (Ala. 2012) (Parker, J.,
concurring) (discussing the lack of evidentiary support for the court’s viability standard).
40
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
41
Id. at 833.
42
Id. at 846.
43
See generally id. at 833 (nowhere in the decision does the Court answer the question of
when life begins).
44
Id. at 858, 869.
45
Id. at 865.
46
Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
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even if “in error.”47 Thus, rather than addressing whether Roe correctly
weighed the State’s interest in life as against the declared right to abortion,
the Casey Court assumed the Constitution afforded a right to abortion, then
it built on Roe as if it were legitimate precedent. The Court concluded that
none of the factual changes since 1973 have any “bearing on the validity of
Roe’s central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which the
State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative
ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”48
Several years later, Justice O’Connor spoke to the notion that stare decisis
is an inexorable command. The doctrine of stare decisis
“demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law.”
Although respect for stare decisis cannot be challenged, “this
Court’s considered practice [is] not to apply stare decisis as
rigidly in constitutional as in nonconstitutional cases.”
Although we must be mindful of the “desirability of
continuity of decision in constitutional questions . . . when
convinced of former error, this Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions,
when correction depends upon amendment and not upon
legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely
exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its
constitutional decisions.”49
A significant portion of the oral argument before the Supreme Court in
Dobbs focused on stare decisis, and whether error alone is a sufficient basis
for reversing prior precedent.50 Justice Kavanaugh listed several prior
Supreme Court cases to support his point that where the prior precedent is
seriously wrong, the Court must refuse to follow it.51 Justice Alito asked the
U.S. Solicitor General whether it was her argument that “a case can never be

47
Id. at 858 (“Even on the assumption that the central holding of Roe was in error, that
error would go only to the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the
recognition afforded by the Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”); id. at 869 (“A decision to
overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if
error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s
legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule of law.”).
48
Id. at 860.
49
Akron, 462 U.S. at 458–59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
50
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 123 (identifying in the word index
every instance of “stare”).
51
Id. at 79–80.
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overruled simply because it was egregiously wrong.”52 The Solicitor General
said that error plus changed facts would be necessary.53 The Solicitor General
maintained that position even when faced with the question of whether the
Court could have overruled Plessy v. Ferguson the year after it was decided
based solely on the fact it was an “egregiously wrong” decision.54 She persisted
in her contention that there must be changed factual circumstances:
It certainly was egregiously wrong on the day that it was
handed down, Plessy, but what the Court said in analyzing
Plessy to Brown and Casey was that what had become clear is
that the factual premise that underlay the decision, this idea
that segregation did[] [not] create a badge of inferiority, had
been entirely mistaken.55
Although several Justices during the oral argument in Dobbs seemed to agree
that an egregious error alone was sufficient to overrule prior precedent,
several other Justices took the position that error alone is insufficient.56 They
emphasized the stare decisis factors, focusing on “whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification[.]”57 Justice Kagan shared her belief
that “not much has changed [factually] since Roe and Casey[.]”58
The Dobbs oral argument concerning stare decisis highlights the need to
permit discovery on issues that would challenge the factual underpinnings in
Roe to demonstrate the Court’s error. Yet, lower courts refuse discovery
concerning issues that would challenge the validity of the viability line.59 As
a result, litigants have not been able to develop a record showing fetal pain,
fetal heartbeat, whether abortion is safer than childbirth, or whether women
need abortion to be successful in the workplace.

52

Id. at 92.
Id.
54
Id. at 92–93.
55
Id. (emphasis added).
56
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 8–13 (questions by Justice Breyer); id.
at 20–21 (question by Justice Sotomayor).
57
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
58
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 32–33.
59
See supra note 6.
53
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Supreme Court Abortion Precedent After Roe and Casey

Supreme Court precedent after Roe and Casey highlight the catch-22 that
states face in attempting to overturn or limit Roe.60 To convince the Court to
reverse Roe, advocates need to demonstrate that the fetus is a human life—
not just “potential life”—prior to viability. However, the current viability
standard not only prevents a state from prohibiting abortion prior to viability
but it also has led courts to prohibit discovery on issues that are aimed at
undermining the right to abortion prior to viability.61 Thus, the catch-22 is
that, on the one hand, states need to produce evidence undermining the
factual underpinnings of the viability standard to reverse Roe;62 but, on the
other hand, courts will not allow states to gather such evidence and use it in
litigation to undermine the factual underpinnings of Roe.63
In addition to the question of life prior to viability, decisions following Roe
and Casey highlight two additional areas for factual findings that could
undermine Roe: facts addressing the question of whether abortion is a safer
alternative to childbirth,64 and facts addressing whether women need the
right to abortion to realize their full potential in and out of the workplace.65
In a recent article discussing the workability of Roe, scholars, Clarke D.
Forsythe and Rachel N. Morrison, explain that the premise that abortions are
safer than childbirth was unsupported in Roe.66 Specifically, the Court based
its decision that abortion was a safe alternative to childbirth despite having

60
See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 281 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (explaining that courts should permit discovery of issues that
would challenge viability as the point at which a state’s interest becomes compelling but
citing cases where courts, including the Dobbs court, refused discovery because the plaintiffs
sought to challenge the viability standard).
61
Id.
62
The Roe Court admitted that if the state could establish that the unborn fetus was a
person, then plaintiff’s case would fail. It naturally flows from that statement that if a litigant
could establish that the unborn fetus is a human being, a plaintiff’s challenge to an abortion
regulation would fail. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973).
63
See supra note 6.
64
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (stating that abortion is “one of the safest medical procedures” in the United
States).
65
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171–72 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(explaining why women need and rely on abortion).
66
Clarke D. Forsythe & Rachel N. Morrison, Stare Decisis, Workability, and Roe v. Wade:
An Introduction, 18 AVE MARIA L. REV. 48, 77–81, 86–87 (2020).
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“no reliable national system of data collection and analysis.”67 If evidence
were produced demonstrating the factual misgivings of the assertion that
abortion is safer than childbirth, then it would provide a basis for satisfying
the fourth factor of stare decisis.
Similarly, at least one amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in
Dobbs directly challenged the factual premise in Roe, Casey, and subsequent
cases, that women need abortion to have equal opportunities in the United
States.68 The brief filed on behalf of 240 women scholars and professionals as
well as prolife feminist organizations asserts “[t]here is no adequate credible
evidence that women, as a group, have enjoyed greater economic and social
opportunities because of the availability of abortion.”69 It provides significant
data challenging the previously unsupported notion that women need
abortion to be successful. Justice Barrett asked questions along these same
lines during the Dobbs oral argument. For example, she asked,
[Given] both Roe and Casey emphasize the burdens of
parenting, and insofar as you and many of your amici focus
on the ways in which forced parenting, forced motherhood,
would hinder women’s access to the workplace and to equal
opportunities, it’s also focused on the consequences of
parenting and the obligations of motherhood that flow from
pregnancy. Why don’t the safe-haven laws take care of that
problem?70
As reflected in Dobbs, both Roe and Casey established viability as the first
instance that states have a strong enough interest in the life of the unborn to

67
Id. at 89 (identifying the unverified and noncollaborative data collection that takes
place at the federal and state levels as well as by private organizations); id. at 90 (“Roe is
unworkable because it was based on an unfulfilled assumption.”).
68
See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[Women’s] ability to
realize their full potential . . . is intimately connected to ‘their ability to control their
reproductive lives.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897
(1992))); id. at 172 (“[Abortion] center[s] on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”).
69
Brief for 240 Women Scholars and Professionals, and Prolife Feminist Organizations in
Support of Petitioners at 17, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021)
(No. 19-1392), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/191392/185366/20210804180314919_191392%20Brief%20of%20240%20Women%20Scholars%20et%20al%20In%20Support%20
of%20Petitioners.pdf.
70
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 56.
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prohibit abortion.71 To the extent Roe and Casey rested on facts tending to
show that abortion is safe, women need abortion to be equal participants in
society, or that the fetus is not human life, the doctrine of stare decisis dictates
that states must have the opportunity to produce new evidence that
undermines the factual underpinnings of Roe and Casey. Banning states from
ever gathering and submitting such information is contrary to the language
in Roe and inconsistent with prior precedent where the Supreme Court has
recognized and provided correction for its errors.72
III. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION V. DOBBS73
In early 2018, Mississippi enacted the Gestational Age Act, which provides
that, in most cases, a person cannot perform an abortion until a physician
first determines and documents a fetus’s probable gestational age.74 Except in
the case of
a medical emergency or in the case of a severe fetal
abnormality, a person shall not intentionally or knowingly
perform, induce, or attempt to perform or induce an
abortion of an unborn human being if the probable
gestational age of the unborn human being has been
determined to be greater than fifteen (15) weeks.75

71

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (“[D]uring the
third trimester, when the fetus is viable, prohibitions are permitted provided the life or
health of the mother is not at stake.”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–65 (the state’s interest is
“compelling” at viability and, at that point, the state could “proscribe abortion”).
72
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (reversing Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), concluding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal).
73
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 141
S. Ct. 2619 (2021).
74
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-191 (1972).
75
Id. The statute defines “severe fetal abnormality” as “a life-threatening physical
condition that, in reasonable medical judgment, regardless of the provision of life-saving
medical treatment, is incompatible with life outside the womb.” Id. A “medical emergency”
is defined as
a condition in which . . . an abortion is necessary to preserve the life of
a pregnant woman whose life is endangered by a physical disorder,
physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering condition
arising from the pregnancy itself, or when the continuation of the
pregnancy will create a serious risk of substantial and irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function.
Id.
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The statute provides that the medical licenses of doctors who violate the Act
shall be suspended or revoked.76
The legislature set the mark at fifteen weeks because it found that “most
abortions performed after fifteen weeks’ gestation are dilation and evacuation
procedures,” which the legislature described as “a barbaric practice,
dangerous for the maternal patient, and demeaning to the medical
profession.”77 The legislature also made findings concerning medical
knowledge of prenatal development, including that unborn babies have the
ability to open and close fingers and sense outside stimulations starting at
twelve weeks’ gestation.78 Finally, the legislature “found that abortion carries
risks to maternal health that increase with gestational age.”79
“On the day the Act was signed into law, Jackson Women’s Health
Organization” filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Act and
requesting emergency relief to enjoin implementation of the Act.80
Concluding that the Act is “effectively a ban on all elective abortions after 15
weeks,” the court granted the temporary restraining order and limited
discovery to the issue of when viability occurs.81 The district court explained
that the “single question” in the case was whether the fifteen-week mark was
before viability.82 Thus, the court concluded that the State’s discovery
requests concerning fetal pain and the detection of a heartbeat were irrelevant
because “discovery was aimed at rejecting the Supreme Court’s viability
framework, not at defending the Act within that framework.”83
At the close of discovery, the Clinic moved for summary judgment.84 It
“submitted evidence that viability is medically impossible at 15 weeks”, and
that the State conceded that it had not identified any “medical evidence that
a fetus would be viable at 15 weeks.”85 “The district court granted summary
judgment to the [C]linic” and permanently enjoined the Act “because
‘viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-191(6).
Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 269–70.
Id.
Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 270.
Id.
Id.
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abortions.’”86 On appeal, the State raised five arguments,87 which the circuit
court “collapse[d] to three: whether the summary-judgment order properly
applies the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, whether limiting
discovery to viability was an abuse of discretion, and whether the scope of
injunctive relief was proper.”88
In affirming the district court’s decision, the circuit court held that under
Casey there is no state interest that “can justify a pre-viability abortion ban.”89
The court explained that pre-viability abortion bans are “unconstitutional
regardless of the State’s interests because ‘a State may not prohibit any
woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.’”90 As a result, the circuit court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying discovery on the issues of fetal pain and
heartbeat because those issues did not relate to the question of when viability
occurs.91 The State argued that the district court abused its discretion because
the denial of discovery means that the court cannot consider new evidence
related to the State’s interests in prohibiting or limiting abortion previability.92 Rather, courts “will remain ‘willfully blind’ to scientific
developments” and will “never see a full record in an abortion case.”93 Judge
James C. Ho, who wrote a concurring opinion, reasoned:
Because Casey establishes viability as the governing
constitutional standard, I am duty bound to conclude that
86
Id. (quoting Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d 536, 539 (S.D.
Miss. 2018)).
87
The five arguments made by the State were that

(1) the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart preserves the
possibility that a “state’s interest in protecting unborn life can justify a previability restriction on abortion;” (2) the district court abused its
discretion by restricting discovery, thus stymying the State’s effort to
develop the record; (3) the district court failed to defer to the legislature’s
findings; (4) the Act imposes no undue burden, as it only shrinks by one
week the window in which women can elect to have abortions [given that
the only abortion provider in Mississippi only provides abortions through
sixteen weeks]; and (5) the Clinic lacked standing to challenge the Act’s
application after 16 weeks . . . .
Id. at 271.
88
Id.
89
Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 271.
90
Id. at 273 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
91
Id. at 275.
92
See id.
93
Id.
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the district court did not abuse its discretion in forbidding
discovery and fact development on the issue of pain. But
neither would it have been an abuse of discretion if the
district court had permitted discovery fact development on
the issue of pain.94
Judge Ho began his explanation by turning to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1), which permits discovery for “any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering [inter alia] the importance of the issues at stake in the
action.”95 He explained that relevance, as used in Rule 26, “encompass[es] any
matter that bears on, or that could reasonably lead to other matter that could
bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”96 Judge Ho believed Rule 26
was broad enough to encompass discovery on factual matters directed at
overturning Roe because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g), which sets
forth the signature requirement for discovery requests and disclosures,
specifically states that the parties can take discovery on matters related to
those “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”97
Under Rule 26, a court cannot prevent discovery solely on the ground that
the information sought in discovery is intended to be used to overrule or
undermine existing precedent.98 Rule 26(g) specifically states that by signing
the request or response, the party or attorney represents that the discovery is
“consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law,
or for establishing new law.”99 As applied in the abortion context, Rule 26
reaffirms that parties are allowed to pursue nonfrivolous claims seeking to
reverse existing law.100 Thus, states should be permitted to take discovery on
issues such as fetal heartbeat and fetal pain to seek a reversal of existing
precedent that triggers the State’s compelling interest in the unborn baby
only at the point of viability. States should also be permitted to take discovery
on the safety of the abortion procedure as compared to childbirth, because
the Court in Roe relied on the purported safety of abortion in reaching its
94

Id. at 281 (Ho, J., concurring).
Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 281 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
96
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
351 (1978)).
97
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)).
98
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)).
99
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(i).
100
Id.
95
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decision that there was a right to abortion.101 A repeatedly asserted basis when
arguing the reliance factor in the stare decisis doctrine is the conclusion that
women need abortion.102 Thus, states should be allowed to take discovery on
the question of whether women actually need, and rely on, the right to
abortion in order to have an equal opportunity to participate in society.
IV. AT A MINIMUM, THE SUPREME COURT MUST SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY IN
DOBBS TO ALLOW STATES TO PROVE WHEN LIFE BEGINS
A.

The Supreme Court Should Overrule Roe and Casey

More than 60 million unborn babies have been aborted because the
Supreme Court has refused for nearly fifty years to reverse Roe.103 In some
respects, the abortion precedent has felt a bit like a shell game–with the Court
pushing around various words to describe the unborn baby, all the while
refusing to answer the one question that should put an end to abortion—
whether what is growing in the mother’s womb is a human life. Instead of
answering that important question, the Court refers to the unborn baby as a
“potential life”104 or a “living organism.”105 According to a dictionary
definition, “potential” means “[h]aving or showing the capacity to become or
develop into something in the future.”106 This definition begs the following
questions. When discussing an unborn human, at what point in the future
does the potential life develop into life? Is it a life at conception, viability,
birth, or some other point in the fetus’s development? If only at birth, why
has the Court used the viability line as the point in time the State’s interest in
that potential life becomes compelling? And if a fetus is only “potential life”
for the first twenty-plus weeks, what exactly is it prior to viability?
101

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 145–46, 149 (1973).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (an entire generation
of women have come to rely on the ability to make reproductive decisions); id. at 927–28
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing the burdens women face when “force[d]” to give
birth); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 48 (“[E]liminating or reducing the
right to abortion will propel women backwards.”); id. at 52 (“[A]bortion has been critical to
women’s equal participation in society.”).
103
See Dorman, supra note 2.
104
Roe, 410 U.S. at 150; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act. It is an
act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman . . . and, depending on one’s beliefs,
for the life or potential life that is aborted.”).
105
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) (“The Act does apply both pre[]viability and post[-]viability because, by common understanding and scientific terminology,
a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the
womb.”).
106
Potential, LEXICO.COM, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/potential (last visited
Mar. 6, 2022).
102
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Supreme Court precedent seems to rest on the notion that prior to
viability, the fetus is not a human life; it is some “living organism”
constituting “potential [human] life” that later develops into human life.107
The Court has not added any clarity to its reasoning by referring to the fetus
as a “living organism” while refusing to identify what species of living
organism the Court believes the fetus to be.
To confuse things even further, without answering the question of when
life begins or explaining what a potential life means, the Roe Court concluded
that the unborn baby is not a person for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection—including the right to life.108 The Justices who
continue to affirm Roe and Casey apparently do not realize the contradictory
positions they take in asserting that the fetus is a living being and, yet, a
woman can abort that living being as long as we do not call it a living human
being.109 In reality, all human life, regardless of its stage of development, is
endowed with the right to life because humans are created in the image of
God, not because a human magically transforms into a “person” at birth.
Scripture repeatedly describes God making, forming, and knitting together
babies in the womb.110
The Supreme Court has continued to affirm Roe even while suggesting
that the decision in Roe might have been in error.111 The possible error that
the Court referred to in Casey is the fact that Roe did “not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins,” yet the Court still went on to conclude that
women have a right to destroy what may or may not be a life.112 If the Court
was not competent to decide when life begins, and thus whether the fetus is
a human life prior to birth, then it should have erred on the side of protecting
the fetus. Instead, the Court refused to decide when life begins but still found
a right to destroy what may or may not constitute human life.113 Looking back
to Pascal’s Wager, the Court chose the wager that has the potential of infinite

107
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (explaining that the state has an interest in the “potential life,”
before viability but that after viability the “fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”).
108
Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“After analyzing the usage of ‘person’
in the Constitution, the Court concluded that the word ‘has application only
postnatally.’ . . . Thus, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a developing organism that is
not yet a ‘person’ does not have what is sometimes described as a ‘right to life.’”).
109
Id. at 846 (“These principles do not contradict one another . . . .”).
110
See, e.g., Job 31:15; Psalm 139:13; Isaiah 44:2, 24; Isaiah 49:5; Jeremiah 1:4–5.
111
Casey, 505 U.S. at 857–59, 869.
112
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
113
Id.
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loss.114
A 2012 Alabama Supreme Court opinion highlights the Court’s error. The
Alabama decision held that the State’s “wrongful-death statute allows an
action to be brought for the wrongful death of any unborn child, even when
the child dies before reaching the point of viability.”115 In that case, the trial
court concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring suit for wrongful death of
a non-viable fetus.116 The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed.117 Justice
Parker explained in his concurring opinion that some states had incorrectly
“applied Roe’s viability standard to wrongful-death law, citing Roe as
prohibiting the recovery of damages for the wrongful death of a child who
dies without reaching viability.”118 “Roe’s statement that unborn children are
not ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is irrelevant
to the question whether unborn children are ‘persons’ under state law.”119
Thus, unless a woman’s right to abortion is implicated, states can treat an
unborn child as a protectable human life.
Justice Parker identified four reasons that “Roe’s viability standard is not
persuasive.”120 First, he explained how “Roe misstated the protection of the
unborn child under the common law.”121 He specifically challenged the Roe
Court’s conclusion that “the unborn have never been recognized in the law
as persons in the whole sense.”122 For example, even though Sir William
Blackstone “recognized that unborn children were persons,” and the Roe
Court cited Blackstone in its decision, the Court “failed to note that
Blackstone addressed the legal protection of the unborn child within a section
entitled ‘The Law of Persons.’”123 Further, the Court “ignored the opening
line of [Blackstone’s] paragraph describing the law’s treatment of the unborn
child: ‘Life is an immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual.’”124 Professor David Kader’s research revealed that “[r]ights and
protections legally afforded the unborn child are of ancient vintage. In equity,
property, crime, and tort, the unborn has received and continues to receive a
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

See Pascal’s Wager, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 735 (Ala. 2012).
Id. at 732.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 740 (Parker, J., concurring).
Id. at 741.
Id. at 742.
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 742.
Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
Id. at 743.
Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129).

436

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:3

legal personality.”125
Justice Parker then explained how Roe “misstated the protection of the
unborn child under tort law and criminal law.”126 Citing various scholars,
Justice Parker pointed out that Roe’s discussion on the legal status of the
unborn in tort law was “perfunctory, and unfortunately largely inaccurate.”127
In particular, “[v]iability played no role in the common law of property,
homicide, or abortion.”128 Nor was there any viability standard connected to
“wrongful-death law because the common law did not recognize a[ny] cause
of action for the wrongful death[.]”129 Rather, the viability standard was not
introduced into American law until 1946 when a federal district court
implied that a cause of action for prenatal injuries would only be recognized
if the unborn child had reached the point of viability.130 Over the next couple
of decades, however, the viability standard lost influence.131 In a thorough
legal survey of prenatal-injury law that took place a decade before Roe was
decided, the researcher concluded that the viability standard in prenatal
injury cases is headed for “oblivion” because courts recognized it was
“illogical and unjust” to the children who suffered prenatal injuries since
viability was “not readily amenable to scientific proof.”132
Justice Parker’s third point was that “Roe’s viability standard was
dictum.”133 He relied on three lines of reasoning to support his conclusion.
First, viability was not a part of the Texas statute at issue in Roe or the Georgia
statute addressed in Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton.134 Because neither
of those cases rested on a viability determination, the Court created a viability
standard without any evidentiary record.135 Second, Justice Parker explained
that the viability standard was dictum in Casey because the Pennsylvania
125

Id. (quoting David Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45
MO. L. REV. 639, 639 (1980)).
126
Id.
127
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 743 (quoting Kader, supra note 125, at 652).
128
Id. (citing Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and
Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 569 n.33 (1987)).
129
Id. (citing Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 525 (W. Va. 1995); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984)).
130
Id. (citing Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946)).
131
Id. at 744.
132
Id. at 744 (alteration in original) (quoting Charles A. Lintgen, The Impact of Medical
Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 600 (1962)).
133
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 744 (emphasis added).
134
Id.
135
Id. (citing Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester
Framework, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 511–12, 516–26 (2011)).
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statute “applied throughout a woman’s pregnancy.”136 Finally, Justice Parker
explained that “the Roe Court’s internal correspondence” identifies the
viability line as “arbitrary.”137 Justice Parker cited an internal memorandum
of Justice Blackmun’s, where he said “that the end of the first trimester [wa]s
[a] critical” time on which to rest the woman’s nearly unfettered right to
abortion, but acknowledged that it was as “arbitrary” a point “as quickening
or viability.”138
Justice Parker’s final reason in support of his conclusion that Roe’s
reasoning is not persuasive was that “the viability standard was
incoherent.”139 Roe’s reasoning was incoherent because (1) the viability
standard lacked foundation and was arbitrary, (2) the Court offered no
understandable explanation why it chose viability as compared to quickening
(when fetal movement is detectable), (3) viability is irrelevant in other areas
of law, and (4) genetics and related medical fields demonstrate that from the
point of conception a separate human life is formed.140 The viability standard
lacks foundation and is “arbitrary”141 because the government’s interest in
regulating or prohibiting abortion is in protecting those who will be citizens
if their lives are not ended in the womb.142 “The State’s interest is in the fetus
as an entity itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point
of viability under conventional medical wisdom.”143
Roe’s viability standard is incoherent because the Court chose viability as
the time when a State’s interest becomes compelling even though it could
have chosen quickening, which occurs six to twelve weeks earlier.144 The
incoherence of that choice is made clear by looking at the definition of
quickening. “Quickening is the point at which the fetus begins discernibly to
move independently of the mother and the point that has historically been
deemed crucial[—]to the extent any point between conception and birth has
136
Id. (citing Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
249, 271–76 (2009)).
137
Id. (quoting Beck, supra note 135, at 520–21, 526).
138
Id. (quoting Internal Supreme Court Memorandum from Justice Blackmun, as quoted
in DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY & SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE
V. WADE 580 (1994)).
139
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 744.
140
Id. at 745–47.
141
Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
794–95 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)).
142
Id. at 745.
143
Id. (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)).
144
Id. (quoting John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 924–25 (1973)).
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been focused on.”145 The Court justified its viability choice by stating that
viability is the point at which the fetus has the capability of surviving outside
the womb.146 Keeping in mind that the Court said it would not, or could not,
decide in 1973 when human life begins, the Court’s choice of viability as
compared to quickening makes no sense.147 Once independent movement of
the unborn baby is detectable, it is unquestionably human life. None of the
abortion cases suggest anything to the contrary.148 But instead of choosing
quickening as the point when a State’s interest in protecting that growing life
becomes compelling, the Court chose viability because—to paraphrase—
before that time, the growing human life is too weak and not developed
enough to have a chance of survival outside the womb.149
Justice Parker also explained that, in other areas of law, viability is
irrelevant to determining the existence of liability for harm to the unborn
child.
Viability is irrelevant to determining the existence of
prenatal injuries, the extent of prenatal injuries, or the cause
of prenatal death. Viability is irrelevant to proving causation
because the unborn child’s anatomic condition can be
observed regardless of viability and, if the unborn child dies,
the cause of its death can be determined by autopsy
regardless of the child’s gestational age. Viability does not
affect the child’s loss of life or the damages suffered by the
surviving family.150
For example, at least thirty-eight states have fetal homicide laws that
criminalize harm caused to a fetus.151 At least twenty-eight of those states
145

Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 745 (quoting Ely, supra note 144, at 924–25).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
147
Id. at 159 (need not and cannot decide when life begins); id. at 163 (state’s interest in
regulating abortion is at viability).
148
See, e.g., id. at 133 (quickening was “the point at which the embryo or fetus became
‘formed’ or recognizably human, or in terms of when a ‘person’ came into being”).
149
Id. at 163 (the fetus is capable of meaningful life outside the womb at the point of
viability).
150
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 746.
151
State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-enhancement for Crimes Against Pregnant
Women, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS (May 1, 2018),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx#State%20Laws. Cf.
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 738 (Parker, J., concurring) (noting that as of 2010, “[a]t least 38 states
have enacted fetal-homicide statutes, and 28 of those states protect life from conception”);
see State v. Courchesne, 298 A.2d 1, 15–18 (Conn. 2010) (affirming conviction under fetal146
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impose criminal penalties at any point post-conception.152 Many of the states
with fetal homicide laws expressly define the fetus as an “unborn child” or
“person.”153 Some courts have also held a fetus to be an unborn child in the
context of proceedings in juvenile court to protect the unborn child from the
mother’s neglect.154 One New York Family Court explained that “[m]aking a
child endure an unsafe environment in the womb is ludicrous when this same
child is afforded protection from illegal drugs and an unsafe environment the
moment it takes its first breath outside the womb.”155 The West Virginia
Supreme Court similarly explained that justice is denied when a tortfeasor’s
civil liability for harming an unborn baby turns on the happenstance that the
unborn child died pre-viability.156
Justice Parker further explained that the continued use of viability as the
time in which the State’s interest becomes compelling is incoherent because
of medical advancements.157 Genetic and medical advancements
demonstrate that a unique human being is formed at the moment of
conception.158 The fact that the individual human being may not be able to
survive independently should not be relevant—it is still a human life.159
Indeed, human life is most innocent prior to birth.160
homicide statute); State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding
constitutionality of fetal-homicide statute). See also Steven Andrew Jacobs, The Future of Roe
v. Wade: Do Abortion Rights End When a Human’s Life Begins?, 87 TENN. L. REV. 769, 847
(2020) (“However, in the four decades since Roe, federal and state lawmakers have been
progressive in their recognition of fetuses as persons under the law. On the federal level, the
U.S. Congress passed the ‘Unborn Victims of Violence Act’ to ensure that ‘protection of
unborn children,’ which includes any ‘member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of
development, who is carried in the womb.’”).
152
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 738.
153
State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-enhancement for Crimes Against Pregnant
Women, supra note 151.
154
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 400–01 (Ala. 2013); In re Unborn Child, 179 Misc.
2d 1, 7–8 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998). But see State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 528 (N.D. 2013)
(holding that an unborn child is not protected by child endangerment statutes); State v.
Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to treat unborn child as a person
for child endangerment statutes).
155
In re Unborn Child, 179 Misc. 2d at 8.
156
Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 746 (Parker, J., concurring) (quoting Farley v. Sartin, 466
S.E.2d 522, 533 (W. Va. 1995)).
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 746–47.
160
Id. at 747. The decisions and laws recognizing that a fetus is an unborn child are
consistent with biblical references indicating that babies in the womb are human lives. For
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As Roe, Casey, and other cases challenging laws imposing limits on
abortion pre-viability demonstrate, the viability standard is incoherent,
arbitrary, and not based on medical science. The Court should use Dobbs to
correct its egregious error in Roe and Casey. The oral argument in Dobbs
seems to reflect that some of the Justices believe egregious error alone is
sufficient to overrule a prior case, while Justices Breyer, Kagan, and
Sotomayor believe that egregious error alone is insufficient.161 For example,
after two short questions by Justice Thomas to clarify the petitioner’s
argument about the nature of the privacy right of abortion, Justice Breyer
asked a question about stare decisis.162 His question turned into two and half
pages of how the Court should overrule a prior case only when there is “the
most convincing justification[s]” lest the Court “‘surrender to political
pressures or new members’ [on the bench].”163 Referencing Justice Breyer’s
questions about stare decisis, Justice Kagan later articulated her belief that
“there has to be a justification, a strong justification in a case like this beyond
the fact that you think the case is wrong” to “prevent people from thinking
that this Court is a political institution that will go back and forth depending
on what part of the public yells loudest.”164 Justice Sotomayor spoke more
bluntly on the question of whether the Court could reverse Casey when she
example, the Bible refers to people who expressed their desire that God had killed them
within the womb, Job 10:18–9; Jeremiah 20:17, a baby grabbing his brother by the heel in the
womb, Hosea 12:3, and a baby leaping for joy while still in the womb, Luke 1:41–5. A right to
abortion, which destroys a growing human life, stands in conflict with the biblical
admonitions not to murder or shed innocent blood. Exodus 20:13; Psalm 106:35, 37–38 (“But
mingled themselves with the nations, and learned their [practices], . . . they [even] sacrificed
their sons and their daughters []to demons, and shed innocent blood, . . . the blood of their
sons and of their daughters, whom they sacrificed []to the idols of Canaan; And the land was
polluted with blood.”). Human life is, at its most innocent, pre-birth.
161
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 10 (Breyer stating only the “most
convincing justification” would be sufficient to overrule and suggesting throughout oral
argument that the belief of some the case was in error is not enough); id. at 15–16
(Sotomayor pointing out that at the time of Roe and now, some people think abortion is
right and others think it is wrong; suggesting that was not enough to overrule Roe without
making it look like a political decision); id. at 32–33 (Kagan also pointing out the continued
conflicting views on abortion); id. at 79–80 (Kavanaugh listing the Court’s prior precedent
where it overruled itself because the prior case was wrong); id. at 92–95 (Alito asking,
“[w]ould it not be sufficient to say that was an egregiously wrong decision on the day it was
handed down and now it should be overruled[;] . . . [c]an a decision be overruled simply
because it was erroneously wrong, even if nothing has changed between the time of that
decision and the time when the Court is called upon to consider whether it should be
overruled”).
162
Id. at 11.
163
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 9–11.
164
Id. at 33.

2022] THE COURT’S OPPORTUNITY TO OVERRULE ROE

441

asked, “[w]ill this institution survive the stench that this creates in the public
perception that the Constitution and its reading are just political acts?”165
When, as here, the prior decisions are based on egregious error and rest
on factual assumptions that are now known to be incorrect,166 the Court
should reverse. If the Court does not seize the opportunity in Dobbs to reverse
Roe and Casey, the Court must at least abandon the viability standard.
B.

If the Court Does Not Reverse Roe, It Should Abandon the Viability
Standard

Although one cannot necessarily predict how the Justices will rule based
on the questions asked during oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked
questions during the Dobbs argument that suggest he appreciates the
arbitrariness of the viability line.167 For example, after pointing out that the
Mississippi statute prohibited abortions after fifteen weeks, the Chief Justice
asked whether all the burdens on women asserted by the Clinic’s counsel
apply with full force to the statute given the difference is only between fifteen
weeks and viability.168 He then asked,
if you think that the issue is one of choice that women should
have a choice to terminate their pregnancy, that supposes
that there is a point at which they’ve had the fair choice,
opportunity choice, and why would 15 weeks be an
inappropriate line? Because viability, it seems to me, doesn’t
have anything to do with choice. But, if it really is an issue
about choice, why is 15 weeks not enough time?169
After the Clinic’s counsel attempted to turn the focus back to the fact that
Mississippi’s law prohibited abortions before viability and that any line other
than viability would be unworkable, the Chief Justice stated he wanted “to
focus on the 15-week ban because that’s not a dramatic departure from
165

Id. at 15.
The pre-viability fetus cannot be merely potential life given that the fetus has a
detectable heartbeat as early as six weeks and can feel pain as early as twenty weeks. See supra
note 6. Advancements in ultrasound technology since 1973, including 3D and 4D photos and
videos of the unborn, reveal that the fetus is undeniably a human life well before birth or
viability. See Dr. Liji Thomas, Ultrasound Scans – Is There a Difference Between 3D and 4D
Scans?, NEWS MED. LIFE SCIS., https://www.news-medical.net/health/Ultrasound-scans-isthere-a-difference-between-3D-and-4Dscans.aspx#:~:text=Comparatively%2C%204D%20ultrasounds%20allow%20for,3D%20ultras
ound%20in%20live%20motion (last visited Mar. 6, 2022).
167
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 51–54.
168
Id. at 52.
169
Id. at 53.
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viability.”170 He explained that “the vast majority” of other countries prohibit
abortions at the fifteen-week mark and other than the United States, China
and North Korea use the viability standard.171
Even Justice Blackmun, who authored Roe, later explained that he would
“have thought ‘it obvious that the State’s interest in the protection of an
embryo . . . increased progressively and dramatically as the organism’s
capacity to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its
surroundings increases day by day.’”172 Yet, courts use Roe to justify their
refusal to permit evidence to be submitted that demonstrates fetal pain or
fetal heartbeats.173
The refusal of courts to permit discovery on these issues is inconsistent
with the fourth stare decisis factor. Under that factor, the Court considers
“whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”174 The rule’s
underlying assumptions are that the Court can make mistakes and parties
can continue to gather facts to prove to the Court that it was a mistake. If a
Supreme Court decision is subsequently interpreted to foreclose discovery of
new facts that might one day prove the Court’s mistake, then the fourth factor
can never be satisfied and is rendered meaningless. Yet, as discussed earlier,
some courts are using the viability standard as a justification to deny
discovery of facts that could demonstrate that the old rule is no longer
significant.
A brief look at three cases highlights that lower courts are treating the
viability rule as a rule that can never change and which precludes discovery
of facts that could lead to Roe’s reversal. As discussed earlier in Dobbs, the
trial court denied discovery on fetal pain.175 On appeal, even the concurring
justice who explained why the trial court could have permitted discovery,
believed “the district court did not abuse its discretion in forbidding
discovery and fact development on the issue of [fetal] pain.”176 He reached
that decision “[b]ecause Casey establishes viability as the governing
constitutional standard[.]”177 However, because the parties are entitled to
170

Id. at 54.
Id.
172
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 280 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J.,
concurring), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989)).
173
See supra note 6.
174
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
175
Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 269.
176
Id. at 281 (Ho, J., concurring).
177
Id.
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assert nonfrivolous arguments that extend, modify, or even reverse existing
law, it was an abuse of discretion to deny discovery on matters that could lead
to reversal of Roe and Casey as the governing constitutional standards.178
In Bryant v. Woodall, decided by the Middle District of North Carolina,
the trial court permitted discovery on three questions that directly challenged
the point of viability: the issue of whether a fetus is viable between twenty and
twenty-six weeks, whether a fetus feels pain between twenty and twenty-six
weeks, and “whether abortions of fetuses between [twenty] to [twenty-six]
weeks pose any greater health risks to pregnant women.”179 It permitted the
discovery on those issues because the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence acknowledges that as technology advances, the point at which
a fetus becomes viable will change.180 Thus, discovery on issues related to
determining viability are consistent with Roe and Casey.
In reaching that conclusion, the court distinguished a decision by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that issued an injunction against an Arizona
law that prohibited abortions pre-viability.181 The Middle District of North
Carolina explained that in the Ninth Circuit case, all parties conceded that a
ban on abortions prior to twenty weeks was a ban on an abortion prior to
viability.182 Thus, as the Middle District of North Carolina explained, the
twenty-week ban was in direct conflict with Casey and, therefore,
unconstitutional.183 In the North Carolina case, however, the parties were
litigating whether viability was possible once a fetus reached twenty weeks
and, thus, discovery could be taken on whether the fetus was viable between
twenty weeks (the Arizona statute) and twenty-six weeks (the then prevailing
understanding of viability).184 The court then permitted discovery on fetal
pain and the safety of abortion during that same time period.185
Even though the North Carolina case permitted discovery, its discussion
of the entrenched viability standard from Casey demonstrates that courts
treat the viability rule as a permanent standard that cannot be overruled. As
a result, courts refuse discovery on matters that would undermine that
viability standard rather than move the point of viability. The Supreme Court
can use Dobbs to correct this assumption by eliminating viability as the
178

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(i).
Bryant v. Woodall, No. 1:16CV1368, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53570, at *21 (M.D.N.C.
Apr. 7, 2017).
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See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
181
Bryant, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53570, at *12–14.
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arbitrary cut-off point and permitting states to demonstrate that protectable
human life occurs well before the point of viability. A decision from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit highlights the need for
the Court to change its precedent.186
North Dakota passed a law prohibiting abortions once there was a
detectable heartbeat in the unborn child.187 The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Clinic, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.188 The North
Dakota law required a physician to determine if the unborn child had a
detectable heartbeat and, if there was a heartbeat, a medical professional
could not perform an abortion.189 The statute had life and health
exceptions.190 The statute subjected physicians to liability for violating the
statute but did not subject women to liability.191 After the Eighth Circuit
quickly explained that the Supreme Court had not yet overruled Roe and
Casey, the court held that it had no choice but to apply the governing legal
standard that “a State ‘may not prohibit any woman from making the
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.’”192 Applying that standard, a
statute that generally prohibits abortions after a fetal heartbeat is detectable
at about six weeks is unconstitutional.193
After that brief discussion as to why it was bound by Supreme Court
precedent to declare the statute unconstitutional, the Eighth Circuit
explained that, in a previous case involving a similar Arkansas statute, it had
noted “the importance of the parties, particularly the state, developing the
record in a meaningful way so as to present a real opportunity for the court
to examine viability.”194 In MKB, the state’s declaration by Dr. Obritsch took
the position that viability occurs at conception, relying on the fact that in
vitro fertilization195 allows an embryo to live outside the human womb for
two to six days after conception.196 Even though the State provided some
support for its argument, the Eighth Circuit held that those facts did “not
186

See MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 770.
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Id. at 776.
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04 (2021).
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(12) (2021).
191
MKB, 795 F.3d at 770.
192
Id. at 772 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007)).
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Id.
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Id. at 773 (quoting Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1119 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)).
195
For a brief overview of the in vitro fertilization process, see In Vitro Fertilization,
MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac20384716 (last visited Mar. 6, 2022).
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create a genuine dispute as to when viability occurs” because its definition of
viability differed from the Supreme Court’s definition of viability.197 Because
courts are interpreting the viability line as an absolute legal standard rather
than one subject to later review and possible reversal, it seems no amount of
evidence provided by a state would create a genuine issue of material fact.
Thus, only the Supreme Court can change the viability standard, but it would
need evidence to reach that conclusion—evidence that most courts are
prohibiting states from taking discovery to obtain.
After explaining that it was bound to affirm the injunctive relief, the
Eighth Circuit explained that “good reasons exist for the [Supreme] Court to
reevaluate its jurisprudence.”198 It identified two primary reasons. First, the
Court’s viability standard “gives too little consideration to the ‘substantial
state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.’”199 The Eighth Circuit
stated that the Court has “tied a state’s interest in the unborn children to
developments in obstetrics, not to developments in the unborn.”200 As a
result, one year an unborn baby could be aborted because the point of
viability was twenty-four weeks but a few years later the unborn baby would
be protected at twenty-three weeks if medical advances moved the time for
viability.201 “How it is consistent with a state’s interest in protecting unborn
children that the same fetus would be deserving of state protection in one
year but undeserving of state protection in another is not clear.”202 Similarly,
depending on the medical standards in a particular community, the same
fetus might be considered viable in one community but not another.203 The
choice of what that critical point is when a State’s interest becomes
compelling “is better left to the states, which find their interest in protecting
unborn children better served by a more consistent and certain marker than
viability.”204 In MKB, the North Dakota legislature had determined the
critical point for asserting the state interest in protecting unborn life was a
detectable heartbeat.205
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The Beck court explained that the judiciary should not substitute its
judgment for the legislature.206 By taking the issue from the states, the Court
has removed the states’ ability to account for medical and scientific
advancements that have significantly expanded our knowledge of prenatal
development.207 There is medical evidence that “a baby develops sensitivity
to external stimuli and to pain much earlier than was [previously] believed
[when Roe was decided].”208 As Judge Jones from the Fifth Circuit explained:
“[B]ecause the Court’s rulings have rendered basic abortion
policy beyond the power of our legislative bodies, the arms
of representative government may not meaningfully debate”
medical and scientific advances. Thus, the Court’s viability
standard fails to fulfill Roe’s “promise that the State has an
interest in protecting fetal life or potential life.”209
The second reason the Eighth Circuit identified for the Court to reevaluate
Casey is that the facts underlying Roe and Casey may have changed.210 One of
those assumptions is that the a woman will be in close consultation with her
physician when making the decision whether to abort.211 Declarations
submitted in the case revealed that many women had abortions without
consulting a physician before or after the procedure; women received no
information about possible complications from the abortion procedure; and
many abortion clinics function “like a mill.”212 One doctor submitted a
declaration stating that women often face coercion or pressure prior to
making the decision to terminate her pregnancy.213 The declarations from
women revealed that abortions may cause adverse physical and mental health
consequences for the women.214 Sandra Cano, who was the “Mary Doe” in
Doe v. Bolton—Roe’s companion case—filed an amicus brief in the Eighth
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Circuit case arguing “that abortion is psychologically damaging to the mental
and social health of significant numbers of women.”215
These cases highlight that, unless the Court eliminates the viability
standard, courts will continue to deny discovery on issues that would support
reversal of Roe. Or, if a court were to permit discovery, they would then have
to ignore the fact of the destruction of human life and rule unconstitutional
any state laws that prohibit abortions prior to viability.216
V. CONCLUSION
In Dobbs, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to reverse Roe and
prohibit elective abortions. As counsel for Mississippi argued, the right to
abortion is the only constitutional right that “involve[s] the purposeful
termination of a human life.”217 It “is an egregiously wrong decision that has
inflicted tremendous damage on our country and will continue to do so and
take innumerable human lives unless and until this Court overrules it.”218 The
right to abortion rests on the Court’s assertion that it cannot, and need not,
answer the question of when human life begins. But as Pascal’s Wager makes
clear, the Court’s purported indecision on the question of when human life
is itself a decision—the Court has wagered that the fetus is not a human life
even though it is undisputed that a fetus growing in the womb leaves the
womb as a human being. At no point does a fetus transform from nonhuman to human. Rather, the Court has hung its hat on the arbitrary point
of viability before a state can prohibit abortion—rejecting the point at which
the fetus independently moves (quickening) or any earlier point, including
fetal heartbeat (at six weeks) or fetal pain (at twenty weeks).
To the extent the Court does not seize this moment to reverse Roe, it must
abandon the viability line and permit states to demonstrate that protectable
215

Id. at 775–76.
One scholar has echoed these sentiments:
Today, states recognize fetuses’ independent rights, and there are
several contexts in which fetuses are legally recognized as persons: (1)
abortion restrictions; (2) fetal homicide laws; (3) restrictions on the capital
punishment of pregnant women; (4) wrongful death statutes; (5)
inheritance rights under property law; (6) legal guardianship; (7) Social
Security and Disability benefits; and (8) prenatal child support laws.
Because the law has developed to recognize fetuses as legal persons
throughout pregnancy, the Court can take notice of these legal
developments and reexamine Roe’s rejection of fetuses’ constitutional
rights.
Jacobs, supra note 151, at 847 (footnotes omitted).
217
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human life exists prior to viability. If the Court does not abandon viability,
the lower courts will continue to treat viability as a standard that is beyond
the reach of the stare decisis doctrine, thereby denying discovery on facts that
could one day lead to reversal of Roe. Although abortion “is unique for the
woman[,] [i]t [is] unique for the unborn child too whose life is at stake in all
of these decisions.”219 The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence turns a
blind eye to the realities of the unborn human life that is destroyed through
abortion. That reality in the United States results in the death of 1,700 unborn
babies each day.220
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Abortion Surveillance —Findings and Reports, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/datastats/abortion.html (last visited Nov.
22, 2021).
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